Introduction
Catch discarding, i.e., the throwing back overboard of unwanted …sh, is a feature of most, if not all, marine capture …sheries. While discarding represents rational behaviour by …shermen, in response to physical constraints such as hold capacity or management constraints such as quotas, it is a non-trivial problem for …shery managers since subsequent survival rates for …sh are generally very low (e.g., Alverson et al. 1994) . As well as being economically wasteful, discarding therefore means that rates of …shing mortality will exceed those indicated by observed levels of …sh landings, making the achievement of conservation targets di¢ cult.
Although not a new problem, discarding has acquired signi…cant public prominence in recent years. In Europe, for example, discards have become symbolic of a perceived failure of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to achieve sustainable management of European …sh stocks. In its last Green Paper on the future of the CFP (CEC 2009), the European Commission identi…ed discards as a major problem and the European Commissioner for Maritime A¤airs and Fisheries has recently announced the intention to introduce an EU-wide ban on discards from 2014. At the same time, it is apparent that quotas, which (as currently applied) create incentives to discard, will remain the cornerstone of conservation policy within the EU for the foreseeable future.
What is unclear, however, is exactly how economic incentives in the …shery can be adjusted so that behaviour which is entirely rational can be prevented or avoided. In particular, unless …shing can be (costlessly) selective, making discarding more costly than retaining …sh on board raises questions about the design of a multispecies quota system and the ability to enforce quotas at the landing site (the usual point of control). Although quotarelated discarding is not yet illegal in Europe (as it is in Norway) there have been trials in the UK and Denmark of schemes to encourage a "voluntary" discard ban (backed up by on-board camera monitoring) in return for increased quota allowances -so-called "catch quota"schemes. While these trial schemes have been reported as being successful in reducing discards (e.g., MMO 2012), it is uncertain whether such a system can be extended to an entire EU ‡eet which already experiences quota compliance problems.
A number of studies have examined and characterised the incentives for …shermen to discard at sea rather than to retain and land a part of the catch in response to both management and technological constraints (Anderson 1994 , Arnason 1994 , Vestergaard 1996 , Hatcher 2005b . In essence, discarding is rational wherever the (opportunity) cost of retaining and landing …sh exceeds its market value (for a review, see Pascoe 1997) . Other studies have focused more generally on the relationship between the harvest technology and the feasibility of harvest policies implemented by a regulator (Turner 1997 , Herrera 2005 , Singh and Weninger 2009 , Holland 2010 . A notable omission from previous studies has been a consideration of the costs to …shermen (in the form of expected penalties) of non-compliance with management targets, including both quotas and the regulation of discards. This observation can be extended to the relatively small number of studies which have addressed the determination of quota prices in multispecies ITQ …sheries (e.g., Vestergaard 1999 , Dupont et al. 2005 , Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr 2005 , Singh and Weninger 2009 , Holland 2010 . Since compliance with quotas must be assured through a system of monitoring and enforcement, there is an inevitable relationship between the quota price and the expected penalty for non-compliance with quotas (Chavez and Salgado 2005, Hatcher 2005a ). Given that quota compliance is normally monitored at the point of landing, however, this relationship also needs to encompass any costs associated with discarding at sea.
The present paper aims to extend our understanding of discard behaviour and quota markets in multispecies quota-managed …sheries by explicitly considering the costs of non-compliance with both quotas and discard bans as well as the costs of selective …shing (or avoidance). We give particular consideration to a situation in which one or more TACs becomes binding (or "restrictive") at a lower level of individual and aggregate e¤ort than do the other TACs, resulting (at the vessel level) in individual quotas which are restrictive or, in the case of ITQs, supply inelastic. Species for which quotas are thus restrictive in a …shery are often referred to as "choke"species.
In the paper we focus on the incentives for legal and illegal …rm behaviour in relation to quotas and discard controls in a multispecies …shery and the resulting implications for quota markets. In order to do so we con…ne our attention to a static model of industry pro…t maximisation, implicitly taking stock sizes as …xed. We do not consider the broader issues of the growth and predator-prey interactions between species in a dynamic setting.
While these issues are important, our interest is in …shermen's behaviour in relation to the management targets and instruments actually chosen by regulators, rather than the determination of optimal (…rst-best) policies for the …shery.
1 Our focus on the static incentive structure of regulation nevertheless enables signi…cant insight into the problems facing managers of multispecies …sheries.
We begin by setting up a simple deterministic model of a multispecies, quota-regulated, …shery in which we assume that both over-quota landings and discards can be deterred by means of a unit penalty imposed by the regulator. The basic …shing technology is assumed to be joint in inputs (see, for example, Vestergaard 1999). More strictly, in the absence of additional inputs committed to avoidance or selective …shing, species are caught in …xed proportions depending upon their relative abundance on the …shing grounds, which we assume is constant. With the addition of costly avoidance inputs, the yields of one or more species can be reduced and the technology is then characterised by "weak output disposability" (Turner 1997, Singh and Weninger 2009) . We go on to examine the impact of a discard ban on vessels' pro…t maximising behaviour, in particular where species quotas are not set in proportion to the availability of species on the …shing grounds, considering …rstly non-tradeable quotas and then a …shery managed using a tradeable 1 In taking this approach we follow a number of previous studies, including Anderson (1994) , Arnason (1994) , Vestergaard (1996) , Hatcher (2005b) and Abbott and Wilen (2009). quota (ITQ) system. We proceed to show the necessary interdependence between the (expected) penalty rates for discards and for over-quota landings in determining vessel behaviour and hence quota market outcomes. Under an e¤ective discard ban, for example, we expect the quota price for choke species to be bid up to the level of the expected penalty for illegal (over-quota) landings. A …nal section concludes.
Model and analysis

Basic …rm model
We model a …shery in which an assemblage of n species of …sh are caught together by a large number of competitive …shing …rms, each operating a single vessel. In a given period, a representative …shing vessel's catch q i of species i is given by q i (e; a), where e is …shing "e¤ort" (a technologically e¢ cient vector of variable inputs) and a represents additional inputs required in order to reduce the yield of certain species, i.e., to …sh selectively. We assume the harvest technology is such that q ie > 0; q iee 0; q ia 0; q iea 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
with the last two derivatives strictly negative for at least one species. Thus, …shing selectively (or "avoidance") with a > 0 implies that total and marginal yields of at least one (but clearly not all) species are reduced. Otherwise, it is implicitly the case that the species are caught in …xed proportions (according to their relative abundance on the …shing grounds). Variable harvesting costs are given by c (e; a), with, we assume, c e ; c ee > 0; c a ; c aa > 0; c ea = c ae = 0:
We allow for the possibility of a tradeable quota (ITQ) regime under which, at market equilibrium, individual vessel quotas Q i for the ith species are traded at lease prices r i . 
The …rst order conditions for e ; a ; d i ; Q i > 0 are then respectively
i p i = ! i ; i = 1; 2; :::; n; (2c) r i = i ; i = 1; 2; :::; n:
Note that in (2a) we must have at least one of the terms [p i i ] q ie strictly positive for vessel activity (e > 0). In (2b) we have a similar requirement for a positive level of avoidance e¤ort a , which requires that i > p i where q ia < 0. From (2c) it is apparent that banning discards requires that i p i < ! i always holds as an inequality, i.e., the marginal cost of discarding (! i ) must always exceed the cost of landing ( i p i ). If ! i = 0, then the discard condition is given by i p i = 0, which means that any species of …sh with a positive expected cost of landing will be discarded at sea. If quotas are tradeable, we can see from (2d) that the i (the unit penalties for landing …sh without quota) will form ceilings on quota prices. If quotas are not tradeable, then the Q i are no longer choice variables and the …nal set of …rst order conditions disappear accordingly.
Non-tradeable individual catch quotas
IQs with a discard ban
If a non-tradeable quota is exceeded at the point of control, i.e., if for species i we have does not hold, which implies that selective …shing is not pro…table and hence a = 0.
Either …sh are landed over-quota, with a penalty incurred, or e¤ort is not expanded beyond the point at which the quota is …lled: this will depend upon the magnitude of i .
The other possible outcome is where (2b) does hold, which implies that it is pro…table to …sh selectively (a > 0), reducing the yield of the species for which the quota is restrictive.
Again, by restrictive we mean that, if …shing is non-selective, this quota binds at a lower level of …shing e¤ort e than do the other quotas. This implies that quotas are not set in proportion to the relative availability of species on the …shing ground (otherwise, all quotas would bind at the same level of -non-selective -e¤ort).
Assume, for example, that in a two-species …shery (i = 1; 2) the quota for species 1 is restrictive in this sense and let the value of ! 1 be arbitrarily large, so that there is no discarding. From (2a) and (2c), the optimal level of e¤ort e solves
The LHS of the equality in (3) is the marginal cost of landing …sh of species 1 illegally (i.e., over-quota), while the RHS of the equality is the marginal cost of reducing the catch of species 1 by reducing …shing e¤ort, including the associated loss in the value of catches of species 2 (for which the vessel still has quota). We can re-write the equality in (3) as
to see that e¤ort is e¤ectively constrained by the quota for species 1 (depending upon the value of 1 ).
From (2b) and (2c), we obtain the condition for a > 0 as
Again, the LHS of the equality in (5) is the marginal cost of landing …sh of species 1
illegally. The …rst term on the RHS of the equality is the marginal cost of reducing the catch of species 1 by …shing selectively. If q 1a < 0, then this is positive. The second term on the RHS of the equality is the associated marginal loss in revenue from a change in the yield of species 2. Assuming that q 1a < 0, this is positive if q 2a < 0. If q 2a = 0 (selectivity has no impact on the yield of species 2) then (5) reduces to
In this case, the optimal levels of …shing e¤ort and avoidance jointly solve
(note that this does not imply that the catch of species 1 is reduced to zero). Equation (7) equates the marginal revenue from species 2 with the marginal cost of e¤ort and the cost of avoidance for the marginal yield of species 1.
IQs with discarding
If, in our two species example, ! 1 = 0, then provided 1 p 1 > 0 the optimal level of e¤ort simply solves
where the marginal catch of species 1 is discarded entirely once the quota is …lled. The optimality condition for avoidance becomes
If q 2a 0, this implies that a = 0: there is no incentive to …sh selectively when discarding is costless.
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If the expected discarding cost ! 1 is positive, but is nevertheless smaller than the expected cost of landing over quota, i.e., if we have 0 < ! 1 < 1 p 1 , then optimal e¤ort solves p 2 q 2e c e = ! 1 q 1e > 0:
Here, all over-quota …sh of species 1 are again discarded rather than landed, but e¤ort is now constrained by the (expected) cost of discarding. If avoidance is pro…t-maximising, then assuming q 2a = 0 the optimal levels of …shing e¤ort and avoidance jointly solve (7) as before.
Tradeable catch quotas (ITQs)
ITQs with a discard ban
Under an ITQ system, quota prices cannot exceed i , the expected penalty for landing …sh without quota. For a discard ban to be e¤ective, it must always be more costly to discard than it is to land …sh (with or without quota). Thus, we require (expected) penalty rates ! i and i such that
7 If we had q2a > 0, i.e., if selective …shing increased the (absolute) yield of species 2, then selective e¤ort would of course be pro…table even though over-quota …sh of species 1 can be costlessly discarded. If this were the case, however, we might presume that the additional inputs would become part of the "normal" pro…t maximising vector of …shing e¤ort inputs e . and hence
If r i = i , the vessel will be indi¤erent between landing …sh legally and illegally, although we assume (as is conventional) that in this case the vessel will land legally if it is possible to do so, i.e., to purchase quota at this price. Given this, a vessel's optimal level of …shing e¤ort is where
in which, for a non-trivial solution (e > 0 and hence c e > 0), we must have at least one of the terms [p i r i ] q ie strictly positive.
With two species, we can write the …rst order condition for e¤ort as
where it is implicitly assumed that the market for both quotas just clears at the same level of e¤ort. We denote the corresponding equilibrium quota prices 0 <r i < p i ; 8i. Consider, though, what will happen if the supply of species 1 quota becomes inelastic to vessels at a lower level of e¤ort than is the case for species 2 quota (this is equivalent to saying that the TAC for species 1 is restrictive, in the sense introduced in the previous section, for the industry as a whole). If the value of 1 is su¢ ciently low that it is nevertheless pro…table for vessels to expand e¤ort further to clear the market for species 2 quota, landing species 1 …sh without quota if necessary, then vessels will be willing to pay up to 1 for species 1 quota and will be indi¤erent between holding quota and paying the penalty for landing over-quota …sh of species 1. 8 With r 1 thus bid up to equal 1 , at the optimal level of e¤ort we will then have
where the …rst term on the LHS is now negative. Assuming for the moment that a = 0, for each vessel (and in aggregate), then there is a unique level of …shing e¤ort e that will just clear the market for species 2 quota, and from (14) and (15), since we have the same value of c e , we must then haver 2 <r 2 . All else equal, therefore, the e¤ect of the restrictive quota on species 1 is to reduce the equilibrium quota price for species 2. The reason for this is simply that the value of the marginal catch of species 2 is reduced, re ‡ecting the fact that it is now more costly to land the associated marginal catch of species 1.
If, on the other hand, the expected penalty rate 1 is high enough to prevent e¤ort expanding further once the quota supply for species 1 becomes inelastic, then there will be excess supply of species 2 quota, with the result that the equilibrium quota price for species 2 is zero. A vessel's optimal level of e¤ort then solves
since we assume that, for any greater level of e¤ort (increasing the catch of species 1) we will have [p 1 1 ] q 1e + p 2 q 2e < c e (note the implicit discontinuity in the marginal bene…t function).
In our two-species example, the condition for positive avoidance e¤ort with respect to species 1 is
where the LHS of the equality is the cost of landing …sh of species 1. To simplify things, let q 2a = 0 as before, so that (17) reduces to
Assuming that q 1a < 0, selective …shing only becomes a rational choice if r 1 > p 1 . Otherwise, it is optimal to …sh non-selectively and (assuming a discard ban is e¤ective) to land all the catch. If selective …shing is pro…t-maximising, then from (14) and (18), optimal e¤ort and avoidance then jointly solve
which, notice, is formally similar to (7). Given q 2a = 0, we can continue to assume that the market for species 2 quota clears at the same level of (aggregate) e¤ort, and since (15) continues to hold, this again implies that the quota price for species 2 is reduced due to the restrictive TAC on species 1. Di¤erentiating through (15) by a and rearranging, however, we obtain
which uses c ea = q 2ea = 0 and is signed given p 1 < 1 (as we have assumed) and q 1ea < 0.
All else equal, therefore, avoidance e¤ort on species 1 increases the species 2 quota price.
ITQs with discarding
With ! 1 = 0, from (2c) and (2d) the discard condition for species 1 is r 1 = p 1 . It is apparent, however, that with costless discarding the equilibrium quota price for species 1 can never rise above p 1 , since there is no demand for quota at a price where the revenue from landing …sh falls below zero. Given (17), therefore, selective e¤ort cannot be pro…t maximising if discarding is costless.
If, however, we have 0 < ! 1 < 1 p 1 , then the quota price ceiling for species 1 becomes ! 1 + p 1 < 1 . In this case a positive level of selective …shing e¤ort is clearly pro…t-maximising (depending upon the marginal cost of avoidance). 
Note
Given this (rather strong) assumption, under either IQs or ITQs vessels have no incentive to discard any …sh having a positive market price. The results are then exactly the same as in the case of an e¤ective discard ban.
Summary and conclusion
We have examined the implications of a discard ban in a multispecies quota …shery, in particular the e¤ects on …rms' pro…t-maximising behaviour and on equilibrium quota prices under an ITQ system. The focus has been on discarding in response to inelastic quota supply for so-called "choke" species, arising from a discrepancy between the proportions in which TACs are imposed for di¤erent species and their relative abundance on the …shing grounds. We have shown that quota market outcomes depend crucially upon the relative costs of discarding and over-quota landings. It is simply not possible to model the formation of quota prices in an ITQ …shery without explicitly considering …rm behaviour in relation to the quota compliance policies implemented by regulators: equilibrium quota prices are sensitive to the expected marginal penalties for both discards and illegal landings as well as to input and output prices.
We have seen that, in the case of non-tradeable quotas (such as individual vessel quotas), an e¤ective discard ban, if it can be imposed, results either in the "choke" species being landed illegally, or in the e¤ective constraint of …shing e¤ort to the point at which the TAC for the choke species binds upon the industry. Which outcome prevails then depends upon the magnitude of the (expected) penalty rate for over-quota landings. A successful discard ban implies a (prohibitively large) expected cost for discarding over-quota …sh and, depending upon the size of expected penalties for illegal landings, this will create incentives for selective …shing (avoidance). If discarding is costless, on the other hand, all choke species will simply be discarded once the corresponding TAC binds: there is no constraint on …shing e¤ort and no incentive for costly avoidance. An expected discarding cost that is positive, but less than the expected cost for illegal landing, can create incentives for avoidance e¤ort but will not eliminate discards of the choke species.
Under an ITQ system, when a choke species TAC becomes binding upon the industry the supply of quota becomes inelastic to the individual vessel. With a discard ban, the corresponding quota price will be bid up to the level of the expected penalty for illegal landings, at which point vessels are indi¤erent between landing legally and illegally. 9 If the expected penalty for illegal landings is high enough, …shing e¤ort is constrained to where the choke species TAC just binds. Otherwise, in ‡ation of the quota price for the choke species (up to the level of the expected penalty for over-quota landings) results in lower equilibrium quota prices for other species. Under ITQs, selective …shing only becomes pro…table (depending on the marginal costs of avoidance) once the quota price exceeds the dockside (landing) price. Avoidance e¤ort reduces the costs to the vessel from catching the choke species and so increases economic pro…ts and hence the quota price for other species.
With costless discarding, the quota price for the choke species can never rise above the dockside price and the additional cost of selective …shing e¤ort is never pro…table. A positive but small (expected) discarding cost (less than the expected cost of illegal landing), on the other hand, in ‡ates the quota price for the choke species above the market price and makes avoidance e¤ort potentially pro…table.
The imposition of a discard ban appears to be a logical and uncontroversial step in reducing economic waste in a multispecies quota …shery. Even assuming that it is technologically feasible to monitor all discards, however, so that vessels can expect to incur a signi…cant cost if they discard, the implications may not be straightforward. Speci…cally, the alternatives to discarding are either an increase in illegal (i.e., over-quota) landings, or more selective …shing, or the constraint of …shing e¤ort to the level at which the most restrictive TAC (the choke species) becomes binding on the industry. As we have seen, which outcome predominates depends upon the expected costs and bene…ts of each alchoke species in the B.C. ground…sh trawl …shery. At the …shery level the explanation is reported as an agreement amongst participants not to engage in "gouging" (charging very high prices for scarce quota). An alternative explanation would be that the expected penalties for landing choke species without quota are not, in reality, very high.
